Inventing Legal Combat: Pro-Poor \u27Struggles\u27 in the Human Rights Jurisprudence of the Nigerian Appellate Courts, 1999-2011 by Okafor, Obiora Chinedu & Ugochukwu, Basil E.
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University
Osgoode Digital Commons
Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper Series Research Papers, Working Papers, ConferencePapers
2016
Inventing Legal Combat: Pro-Poor 'Struggles' in the
Human Rights Jurisprudence of the Nigerian
Appellate Courts, 1999-2011
Obiora Chinedu Okafor
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, ookafor@osgoode.yorku.ca
Basil E. Ugochukwu
ugochukwubc@yahoo.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/olsrps
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, and the Transnational Law
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Research Papers, Working Papers, Conference Papers at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper Series by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Recommended Citation
Okafor, Obiora Chinedu and Ugochukwu, Basil E., "Inventing Legal Combat: Pro-Poor 'Struggles' in the Human Rights Jurisprudence
of the Nigerian Appellate Courts, 1999-2011" (2016). Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper Series. 149.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/olsrps/149
OSGOODE HALL LAW SCHOOL 
LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER SERIES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inventing Legal Combat: Pro-Poor 'Struggles' in the Human 
Rights Jurisprudence of the Nigerian Appellate Courts, 1999-
2011 
African Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 7, pp. 429-456, 2014.  
 
 
 
 
Obiora C. Okafor 
Basil E. Ugochukwu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from:  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2760389 
  
 
Further information and a collection of publications from the Osgoode Hall Law School Legal Studies Research Paper 
Series can be found at: 
http://www.ssrn.com/link/Osgoode-Hall-LEG.html 
 
 
Editors: 
Editor-in-Chief: Carys J. Craig (Associate Dean of Research & Institutional Relations and Associate Professor, Osgoode 
Hall Law School, York University, Toronto) 
Production Editor: Antonnia Kiana Blake (Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto) 
 
 
Research Paper No. 42                                                                        Volume 12, Issue 9, 2016 
  
Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper No. 42 
Vol. 12/ Issue. 9/ (2016) 
 
Inventing Legal Combat: Pro-Poor 'Struggles' in the Human Rights 
Jurisprudence of the Nigerian Appellate Courts, 1999-2011 
African Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 7, pp. 429-456, 2014. 
 
Obiora C. Okafor 
Basil E. Ugochukwu 
 
Abstract: 
This article deals with the question whether the jurisprudence of Nigeria’s appellate courts 
has helped advance or impede the struggles of the poor to assert their human rights in the 
country. The article begins by defining, delimiting, and situating the concepts “struggle” 
and “human rights as struggle.” It then moves on to identify and discuss the factors that 
make the struggles that the poor and the subaltern must wage to realize their human rights 
a tough one. Following this discussion, the article turns its attention to its main focus, i.e., 
an analytical examination of the ways in which the corpus of human rights jurisprudence of 
the Nigerian appellate courts has either aided and/or inhibited the struggles of the poor 
and the subaltern in that country during the period under study. The latter discussion is 
sub-divided into two segments: the first is focused on the engagement of these courts with 
the pro-poor struggles of Nigerian Labour, while the second is devoted to an analysis of the 
attitude of the courts to other kinds of pro-poor human rights struggles in Nigeria. In both 
cases, given space and other constraints, only small but representative samples of the 
relevant cases are discussed. 
 
Keywords:  
Appellate Courts, Human Rights, Jurisprudence, Nigeria, Struggle 
 
Author(s): 
Obiora C. Okafor 
Osgoode Hall Law School, York University  
E: ookafor@osgoode.yorku.ca 
 
Basil E. Ugochukwu 
Osgoode Hall Law School, York University  
E: ugochukwubc@yahoo.com 
 
 
 
 
 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2760389 
© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���4 | doi �0.��63/�7087384-��34�054
African Journal of Legal Studies 7 (�0�4) 4�9–456
brill.com/ajls
Inventing Legal Combat: Pro-Poor “Struggles” in  
the Human Rights Jurisprudence of the Nigerian 
Appellate Courts, 1999–2011
Obiora Chinedu Okafor* and Basil Ugochukwu
Osgoode Hall Law School, Ignat Kaneff Building, York University,  
4700 Keele Street, Toronto, ON, Canada M3J 1P3
*Corresponding author, e-mail: ookafor@yorku.ca
Abstract
This article deals with the question whether the jurisprudence of Nigeria’s appellate 
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and/or inhibited the struggles of the poor and the subaltern in that country during the 
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focused on the engagement of these courts with the pro-poor struggles of Nigerian 
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1 Introduction
It is a widely established fact that in the real world, the enjoyment of human 
rights is hardly, if ever, won freely; and this has always been so regardless of 
the content of the prevailing positive laws in a given locale – the Constitution 
included. Rather, human rights have tended to be won through (often intense 
and/or lengthy) social struggles. The American Civil Rights movement, the 
fight to decolonize the third world, the eventual collapse of the apartheid 
regime in South Africa, and the fight for women’s rights, vindicate this truism.1
The subject of this article is the “struggle” dimension of human rights pro-
tection and how this has played out in the jurisprudence of the Nigerian appel-
late courts. The main questions discussed herein are: to what extent have these 
appellate courts helped to either advance or undermine the struggles of the 
poor and/or marginalized in Nigeria to free themselves of the bonds of their 
social, ideational, political, and economic subjugation? With what conceptual 
apparatuses, if any, have these courts dealt with this issue? And to what extent 
does the observed attitude of these courts to this issue either strengthen or 
problematize particular theoretical insights about the relationship between 
human rights discourses and praxis in our time (including human rights juris-
prudence) and the struggles/resistance of the subaltern?
The particular theoretical framework that the article anchors itself in is 
Upendra Baxi’s theory on the emergence in our time of a trade-related market-
friendly (TREMF) human rights paradigm, which posits that the much more 
people-centered Universal Declaration of Human Rights paradigm is now 
being displaced (at least to a significant extent) by this TREMF paradigm that 
values the interests of various formations of governmental power and global 
capital over that of ordinary people, all-too-often at the expense of the human 
rights of the subaltern.2 For the purposes of this article, the third leg of the 
1    See L. Araiza, To March for Others: The Black Freedom Struggle and the United Farm Workers 
(Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014); M.J. Klarman, ‘Brown, Racial 
Change, and the Civil Rights Movement’, 80 Virginia Law Review (1994), 7–150; J.D. Hall, ‘The 
Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the Past’, 91 The Journal of American 
History (2005), 1233–1263; P. Dwyer and L. Zeilig, African Struggles Today: Social Movements 
since Independence (Chicago, IL: Haymarket Books, 2012); N. Worden, The Making of Modern 
South Africa (Chichester: Wiley, 2012); S. Kelly and J. Bresli (eds), Women’s Rights in the Middle 
East and North Africa: Progress Amid Resistance (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010).
2    See U. Baxi, The Future of Human Rights (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002), at 132; See also 
U. Baxi, ‘Market Fundamentalism: Business Ethics at the Altar of Human Rights’. 5 Human 
Rights Law Review (2005), 1–26.
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Baxian TREMF thesis, as it was previously articulated,3 is the most relevant. 
This leg of the thesis posits that in the emergent TREMF paradigm, the pro-
gressive State is now seen as one that is market efficient in suppressing and 
de-legitimating the human rights-based practices of resistance of its own citi-
zens and that is also capable of unleashing a reign of terror on some of its 
citizens, especially those of them that actively oppose the State’s excessive 
softness toward global capital.4 And so the question here is to what extent does 
the human rights jurisprudence of the Nigerian appellate courts vindicate or 
trouble this leg of the Baxian TREMF thesis?
The main discussion in the article begins by defining, delimiting, and situat-
ing the concepts “struggle” and “human rights as struggle.” It then moves on to 
identify and discuss the factors that make the struggles that the poor and the 
subaltern must wage to realize their human rights a tough one. Following this 
discussion, it turns its attention to an analytical examination of the ways in 
which the human rights jurisprudence of the Nigerian appellate courts have 
either aided and/or inhibited the struggles of the poor and the subaltern in 
that country during the period under study. This discussion is sub-divided into 
two segments: the first is focused on the engagement of these courts with the 
pro-poor struggles of Nigerian Labor, while the second is devoted to an analysis 
of the attitude of the courts to the pro-poor struggles of other groups and indi-
viduals in Nigeria. Thereafter, the article ends in a short concluding section.
2 On the “Struggle” Dimension of Human Rights
In this section, an explanation is offered for the sense in which the word “strug-
gle” is used in this article. This concept is also delimited and briefly placed in a 
theoretical and historical context. As used in the article, the concept of struggle 
leans for its meaning upon the extraordinarily insightful and powerful human 
rights work of Upendra Baxi, who – following the famed French theorist Michel 
Foucault – maintains that “struggles, properly so called, are ‘an opposition to 
the effects of power linked with knowledge, competence, and qualification – 
struggles against secrecy, deformation, and mystifying representation imposed 
on people’ ”.5 This understanding is reconcilable with Nancy Fraser’s notion 
of the ways in which “subaltern counter publics” are constituted by subordi-
nated groups so as to permit them to “formulate oppositional interpretations 
3    Ibid.
4    Ibid.
5    U. Baxi, The Future of Human Rights (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006).
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of their identities, interests and needs.”6 We also agree with Graham Harrison 
that “struggle is a process, a result of mobilization provoked by some form of 
resistance”.7 It is in these convergent senses that the term “struggle” is used 
in this Article – in sum, as a process of mobilizing and expressing opposition 
to the effects of power on the identities, interests and needs of subordinated 
groups, in this case the poor.
Along this line, we also have to consider the assertion that human rights is 
but “the flipside of the coin of legitimate resistance.”8 For this reason therefore:
Whether one considers human rights “inalienable”, “fundamental” or 
“basic”, or refers to it as “trumps” or “natural entitlements”, the concept of 
human rights represents a countervailing force to the awesome power 
of the state and society at large. If rights are “inalienable”, this implies that 
should they be alienated they may be “taken back”, either by those whose 
rights have been violated, or by others on their behalf. Human rights are 
not about asking favours and they are not merely moral or rhetorical con-
cepts; they are guides to action and triggers of resistance against what is 
perceived as the illegitimate use of power, in particular state power.9
According to Fields and Narr, the realization of human rights is not just about 
ideology but is in the main a “socially constructed fight.”10 To them, human 
rights become realized “only by the struggles of real people experiencing real 
instances of domination.11 In a somewhat hyperbolic yet meaningful sense, 
they assert that the world itself is a vast “field of struggle over rights without any 
guarantees of success.”12 As importantly, the recognition of the “struggle” com-
ponent of the effort to realize human rights has even extended to the discus-
sion of its very origins/nature. Dembour has, for instance, demarcated human 
rights discourse into four different schools – a natural school that conceives 
rights as given, a deliberative school that looks at it as something agreed upon, 
6     N. Fraser, ‘Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually 
Existing Democracy’, 25/26 Social Text (1990), 56–80.
7     G. Harrison, ‘Bringing Political Struggle Back in: African Politics, Power and Resistance’, 
89 Review of African Political Economy (2001), 387–402.
8     See C. Heyns, ‘A “Struggle Approach” to Human Rights’, in A. Soeteman (ed.), Pluralism in 
Law (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001), Chapter 10, at 171.
9     Ibid.
10    A. Belden Fields and W.-D. Narr, ‘Human Rights as a Holistic Concept’, 14 Human Rights 
Quarterly (1992), 1–20, at 5.
11    Ibid.
12    Ibid at 6.
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and the protest school to whom rights are fought for and a discourse school that 
views rights as something talked about.13 Clearly, our attention here is on the 
protest school and its conception of human rights as “struggle”; which needless 
to state aligns closely with Odinkalu sound claim that “throughout history, the 
protection of human rights has been won by struggle.”14
If, as these scholars argue, the realization of human rights is much more 
about struggle, the ancillary question arises as to whether poor/subaltern indi-
viduals and communities have to struggle very hard and long to claim their 
rights? The unfortunate reality is that, as a result of a variety of factors, they 
have to in most contexts. The fact that norms prescribing human rights and 
calling for their promotion and protection usually exist (almost in a kind of 
normality) alongside persistent violations of those same rights does give some 
insight into the magnitude of struggles that victims and those working to assist 
them have to mount to earn even the most minimal victory in this regard.15 As 
Engle Merry has noted in the specific context of violence against women:
The law does significant cultural work in challenging men’s sense of enti-
tlement to hit partners and providing women with a new understand-
ing that hitting is a crime no matter what they have done. Yet the uphill 
struggle of local activists in this town to mobilize the law in support of 
their movement suggests that the law is frequently subverted in its inter-
vention on behalf of battered women.16
In the next section, a rough though brief discussion of some of the obstacles 
that human rights victims (especially the poor) and the activists who claim 
to struggle on their behalf might have to overcome in their struggle to realize 
their human rights, is provided.
13    See M.-B. Dembour, ‘What are Human Rights? Four Schools of Thought’, 32 Human Rights 
Quarterly (2010), 1–20.
14    C.A. Odinkalu, ‘Why More Africans don’t Use Human Rights Language’, 2 Human Rights 
Dialogue (2000), 3–4.
15    S. Engle Merry, ‘Global Human Rights and Local Social Movements in a Legally Plural 
World’, 12 Canadian Journal of Law and Society (1997), 247–271, at 250; see also J. Ranciere, 
‘Who is the Subject of the Rights of Man?’, 103 The South Atlantic Quarterly (2004), 297–
310; A.D. Jordan, ‘Human Rights or Wrongs? The Struggle for a Rights-based Response to 
Trafficking in Human Beings’, 10 Gender and Development (2002), 28–37.
16    See Engle Merry, ibid., at 252.
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3 Treading a Rough Road
Most human rights activists and campaigners are familiar with the daily chal-
lenges that they must endure to bring the promise of human rights to reality 
for the people on whose behalf they claim to struggle. These activists often 
tread dangerous paths, strewn all over with sometimes extraordinary hurdles, 
which tend to task their courage and endurance.17 Discussed below are some 
examples of these hurdles; difficulties which tend to lead us to appreciate 
more acutely the fact that human rights tend not to be “given,” but have to be 
fought for. As the obstacles that individuals and groups must surmount in their 
effort to realize human rights tend to be context-specific, the challenges that 
are discussed below are those that are most relevant to the Nigerian socio-legal 
environment.
3.1 Legal Status: Slippery and Elusive
To even begin to mobilize against human rights violations and engage the legal 
processes needed to redress these wrongs, human rights groups must first be in 
existence – legally speaking, that is. Almost every country in the world requires 
the voluntary and public-spirited organizations which often seek to work on 
behalf of the poor and the marginalized to obtain some form of legal status 
or the other in order to function.18 While such status may be easily obtained 
in some jurisdictions, it is difficult to obtain in others. In such countries, 
groups that already enjoy such status could also be de-registered or forcefully 
dissolved.
The point here is that granting or withholding legal status is one of the major 
ways that intolerant governments try to control and restrict the effectiveness of 
human rights activists and their struggles (especially those who have organized 
17    M. Posner and C. Whittome, ‘The Status of Human Rights NGOs’, 25 Columbia Human 
Rights Law Review (1993–1994), 269–290; T.L. Helge, ‘Policing the Good Guys: Regulation of 
the Charitable Sector through a Federal Charity Oversight Board’, 8 International Journal 
of Civil Society Law (2010), 49–115; A. Larok and J. Kiija, ‘When the Motive is Wrong. . . . : An 
Examination of Key Concerns NGOs Have with the Legal, Regulatory and Policy Regime in 
Uganda’, 7 International Journal of Civil Society Law (2009), 24–32; O.B. Breen, P. Ford and 
G.G. Morgan, ‘Cross-Border Issues in the Regulation of Charities: Experiences from the UK 
and Ireland’, 11(3) International Journal of Not-For-Profit Law (2009), 5–41.
18    See ‘NGO Laws in Sub-Saharan Africa’ 3 Global Trends in NGO Law Online (2011), available 
online at http://www.icnl.org/research/trends/trends3-3.html (accessed 26 July 2014); 
see also K. Appiagyei-Atua, ‘Human Rights NGOs and their Role in the Promotion and 
Protection of Rights in Africa’, 9 International Journal of Minority and Group Rights (2002), 
265–289, at 267.
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themselves into non-governmental organizations). While announcing the 
launch of the African Civil Society Support Initiative in 2013, the International 
Center for Not-for-Profit Law stated that “Recent years have witnessed prolifer-
ating efforts by various governments in Africa to legally restrict the civic space 
for civil society. These restrictive laws often target human rights defenders, 
democracy assistance groups, and civil society organizations (CSOs), and often 
bear striking resemblance to each other.”19
Recently the Nigerian House of Representatives called a Public Hearing to 
debate a private member’s “Bill to Regulate the Acceptance and Utilization 
of Financial/Material Contributions of Donor Agencies to Voluntary Organi-
zations.” Although its chances of enactment are remote and it is outside the 
period under study here, if passed into law and signed by the President, the Bill 
will place onerous burdens on the activities of civil society groups in the coun-
try. The Bill also has a provision which allows the President without consul-
tation to make an order prohibiting a CSO that is deemed dangerous to the 
good government of Nigeria or any part of it. It also has a provision that man-
dates CSOs interested in working with government ministries, departments or 
agencies to meet criteria prescribed by such MDAs.20 Not only will foreign and 
Nigerian CSOs face new registration requirements under the Bill, it specifically 
bans the registration of gay clubs, societies and organizations.21 All these mea-
sures would severely affect the human rights struggle in the country.
3.2 Hunted like Game
When CSOs manage to secure legal existence and can then commence their 
activities, depending on how politically consequential those activities are, they 
all-too-frequently have to contend with overt, undisguised government actions 
to scuttle their struggles.22 Human rights defenders are mostly in the line of 
19    See International Center for Not-For-Profit Law, ‘African Civil Society Support Initiative’, 
available online at http://www.icnl.org/programs/africa/African%20Civil%20Society%20
Support%20Initiative%201%20pager%20ENG-fr.pdf (accessed 26 July 2014).
20    See International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law, ‘NGO Law Monitor: Nigeria’, available online 
at http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/nigeria.html (accessed 26 July 2014).
21    Ibid.
22    L.S. Wiseberg, ‘Protecting Human Rights Activists and NGOs: What More can be done?’, 
13 Human Rights Quarterly (1991), 525–544; F.D. Gaer, ‘Reality Check: Human Rights 
Nongovernmental Organizations Confront Governments at the United Nations’, 16 Third 
World Quarterly (1995), 389–404; T. Landman, ‘Holding the Line: Human Rights Defenders 
in the Age of Terror’, 8 The British Journal of Politics and International Relations (2006), 
123–147; S. Dicklitch and D. Lwanga, ‘The Politics of being Non-Political: Human Rights 
Organizations and the Creation of a Positive Human Rights Culture in Uganda’, 25 Human 
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fire because of the work they do which involves exposing behavior that indi-
viduals, institutions and governments would rather hide away from the public 
view. They are daily calling for better governmental accountability, more tol-
erant politics, less interference with individual rights and better respect for 
international human rights standards. Not all governments are interested in 
upholding these values and they too often stop at nothing to prevent public 
scrutiny of their policies and actions.
It is well very well known that under the military in Nigeria human rights 
activists faced unprecedented government brutality and suppression of their 
activities. There were instances of extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests, deten-
tions, travel restrictions and illegal searches and other violations of privacy.23 
Even so, press freedom was greatly suppressed, prisoners were very poorly 
treated and the citizenry lived in a state of absolute fear and intimidation.24 
While the situation under the current post-1999 civilian democratic dispen-
sation has improved greatly and has clearly not been nearly as bad as it was 
under the military, there have still been some instances of the violation of the 
human rights of some activists.25
Rights Quarterly (2003), 482–509; O.C. Okafor, The African Human Rights System, Activist 
Forces, and International Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); 
O.C. Okafor, Legitimizing Human Rights NGOs: Lessons from Nigeria (Trenton, NJ: Africa 
World Press, 2006); O.C. Okafor, ‘What should Organized Human Rights Activism in 
Africa Become? Contributory Insights from a Comparison of NGOs Labor-led Movements 
in Nigeria’, 16 Buffalo Human Rights Law Review (2010), 113–154.
23    B. Ugochukwu, ‘The State Security Service and Human Rights in Nigeria’, Third World 
Legal Studies (1996–1997), 71–101.
24    Ibid. See also C. Nwankwo, B. Ugochukwu and D. Mbachu, Human Rights Practices in the 
Nigerian Police (Lagos: Constitutional Rights Project, 1994) (discussing how police prac-
tices endangered human rights in Nigeria); also J. Effah, Modernised Slavery: Child Trade 
in Nigeria (Lagos: Constitutional Rights Project, 1996) (discussing trafficking in children); 
O. Odemwingie, A Harvest of Blooms (Lagos: Media Rights Agenda, 2000) (reporting 
human rights atrocities against the media in Nigeria in 1999); C. Gahia, Human Rights In 
Retreat: A Report Of Human Rights Violations Of The Military Regime Of General Ibrahim 
Babangida (Lagos: Civil Liberties Organization, 1992) (chronicling human rights viola-
tions committed by the military regime headed by Babangida from 1985 to 1992). Also 
Civil Liberties Organization, Annual Report on Human Rights in Nigeria (1990–1996) 
(annual reports of violations of various human rights in the country); other human rights 
organizations had similar reports. See, for example, Committee for the Defence of Human 
Rights, 1997 Annual Report on the Human Rights Situation in Nigeria (1998).
25    See P.C. Aka, ‘Nigeria Since May 1999: Understanding the Paradox of Civil Rule and 
Human Rights Violations under President Olusegun Obasanjo’, 4 San Diego International 
Law Journal (2003), 209–276, at 211 (stating that ‘because army rule between 1983 and 1999 
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3.3 When the Constitution Cuts both Ways
Another challenge that persons who struggle to expand human rights protec-
tion through the judicial process must confront is the nature of certain consti-
tutional norms themselves. It might sound paradoxical and counter-intuitive 
at first brush that the Constitution which ostensibly is designed to redress 
human rights violations could actually become a stumbling block in struggles 
to enforce those rights. The unfortunate fact, however, is that in some jurisdic-
tions (Nigeria included), human rights activists must address a Constitution 
that seems to cut both ways. In other words, what it gives with the right hand 
it tends to take away with the left.
Writing specifically about the Nigerian constitution, Taiwo states that while 
in one breath its main clauses confer a range of rights, in another breath it 
renders these rights nugatory through what the author refers to (somewhat 
mistakenly) as “claw-back” clauses. To him, claw-back clauses are “those excep-
tions that are usually attached to constitutional provisions, especially regard-
ing human rights.”26 Continuing, he notes that:
For example when it is said in the Nigerian constitution that “Every per-
son shall be entitled to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence” the claw-back clause in the very next provision 
states: “Nothing in this section shall invalidate any law that is reasonably 
justifiable in a democratic society – (a) in the interest of defense, public 
safety, public order, public morality, public health or economic well being 
of the community or (b) for the purpose of protecting the rights and free-
doms of other persons.27
We must bear in mind though that Taiwo’s position warrants some caution 
so not to convey the impression that all human rights are absolute and to be 
enjoyed without any limitations. Such a claim would be difficult to sustain as 
it is well known that some rights could indeed be legitimately restricted in fur-
therance of more pressing public interests. In any case, such clauses as appear 
in the Nigerian Constitution are standard fare the world over in domestic stat-
utes and international human rights treaties. Nevertheless, the anxiety here, 
especially in the specific Nigerian context, is regarding the opportunity that 
was characterized by massive human rights violations, the return to civil rule left renewed 
hope for improved human rights’).
26    O. Taiwo, ‘The Legal Subject in Modern African Law: A Nigerian Report’, 7 Human Rights 
Review (2006), 17–34, at 23.
27    Ibid. at 24.
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the bendability of constitutional provisions could provide to some judges who 
might want to behave unscrupulously.
3.4 When the Guard Turns Predator
In Nigeria, as in many other societies, the courts are expected to be guardians 
of human rights and liberties. As stated by the late Kayode Eso ( former Justice 
of the Nigerian Supreme Court):
In the operation of the rule of law, the role of the judge cannot and 
must not be less. Judges must stand resolutely to prevent any attempted 
encroachment on the liberty of the subject by the executive. They must 
be alert, very alert to see that if ever there is a coercion by the executive, 
that action must be justified in law and not justified on the whims and 
caprices of man.28
Yet, this is all-too-often easier said than done. Rather than be counted upon 
to protect the weak and ease their legal burdens, the courts can through their 
judgments obstruct and toughen the struggles of the poor to protect their 
rights. The ways in which this has sometimes happened in Nigeria have long 
been discussed in the literature. It can occur through an illiberal and nar-
row interpretation of the requirement of “standing” to present human rights 
claims.29 It also manifests itself in the conservatism and timidity that makes 
some judges overly cautious in exercising their jurisdiction in cases where 
the government is an interested party.30 It has also presented in the form of 
poorly articulated doctrinal rules that are not constitutionally grounded and 
that complicate rather than ease the human rights enforcement process (as 
for instance the rule that creates a forced binary between what the Supreme 
28    K. Eso, ‘Judge-Lawyer Co-operation in the Protection of Human Rights’, in M.A. Ajomo 
and B. Owasanoye (eds), Individual Rights Under the 1989 Constitution (Lagos: Nigerian 
Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, 1993), p. 84.
29    T. Ogowewo, ‘The Problem of Standing to Sue in Nigeria’, 39 Journal of African Law (1995), 
1–18.
30    D.C.J. Dakas, ‘Confronting the Poverty and Tyranny of Judicial Passivity in Nigeria: 
Bolstering up the Case for Judicial Activism with Reference to Jewish Law’, 10 Sri Lanka 
Journal of International Law (1998), 63–70; D.C.J. Dakas, ‘Judicial Reform of the Legal 
Framework for Human Rights Litigation in Nigeria: Novelties and Perplexities’, in 
E. Azinge and D.C.J. Dakas (eds), Judicial Reform and Transformation in Nigeria (Lagos: 
Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, 2012).
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Court calls “principal/main” and “accessory” claims in human rights cases).31 
Under this rule, which has been described as “dubious,”32 a court only enter-
tains a human rights claim filed as such if it is the main claim in the writ filed 
by the plaintiff, and is not ancillary to another (non-human rights) claim in the 
same writ.33 But what this rule does in reality is to deny litigants who have 
multiple claims (some of a human rights nature and others not of that type) 
the right to decide for themselves how and in what order they are to present 
those claims. This clearly impedes the struggle to vindicate human rights, and 
does so on a mere technicality.
Having defined, delimited and situated the concept of struggle, as well as 
identified and discussed the factors that make the struggles that the poor and 
the subaltern must wage in order to realize their human rights an even tougher 
one, our attention must now turn to the “meat” of the article, i.e., an exami-
nation of the ways in which the human rights jurisprudence of the Nigerian 
appellate courts have aided or inhibited the struggles of the poor and the 
subaltern in that country during the period under study. As was noted in the 
introductory section of this article, this last discussion is sub-divided into two 
segments: the first is focused on the engagement of these courts with the pro-
poor struggles of Nigerian Labor, while the second is devoted to an analysis of 
the attitude of the courts to the pro-poor struggles of other groups and indi-
viduals in Nigeria.
4 Struggle Meets the Human Rights Jurisprudence
In many societies, individuals who (because they are impoverished and/or 
marginalized) are usually unable to effectively litigate their rights in the law 
courts can sometimes count upon certain civil society activists to do so on 
their behalf. This is usually accomplished through what is now known as “pub-
lic interest” or “social action” litigation.34 Often the objective is to use a single 
31    E.S. Nwauche, ‘The Dubious Distinction between Principal and Accessory Claims in 
Nigerian Human Rights Jurisprudence’, 52 Journal of African Law (2008), 66–88.
32    Ibid. at 67.
33    See Tukur v Government of Taraba State, [1997] 6 NWLR (Pt 510) 549; see also Sea Trucks 
Nigeria Limited v Payne, [1999] 6 NWLR (Pt 607) 514; Ibrahim Abdulhamid v Talal Akar, 
[2006].
34    S.L. Cummings and D.L. Rhode, ‘Public Interest Litigation: Insights from Theory and 
Practice’, 36 Fordham Urban Law Journal (2009), 603–652; J.K. Krishnan, ‘Public Interest 
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item of litigation to bring about a fundamental change in governmental policy 
or practice. In Nigeria, as elsewhere, the effectiveness of such activists in exe-
cuting this task would tend to depend on a number of factors, including the 
attitude of the courts to such public interest litigation struggles. For instance, 
until recently at least, the very narrow judicial interpretation of the “stand-
ing” rules which govern human rights litigation was a highly obstructive judi-
cially-constructed impediment to the effectiveness of most such struggles.35 
The question therefore is to what extent have the appellate courts in Nigeria 
helped advance or impede the struggles of the poor/subaltern to realize their 
human rights (whether through their own actions or with the assistance of 
civil society activists). Only by examining a purposive sample of the decided 
cases would it be possible to respond in a systematic way to this question, and 
that is the major focus of the remainder of this section of the article.
It must be noted, however, that although not all the suits examined below 
are framed in explicitly pro-poor language, all of them do have significant 
implications (howsoever collateral) for the struggles of the poor/marginalized 
in Nigeria. The pro-poor relevance of these suits is either reflected in or infer-
able from the social status of those who filed them (that is the poor them-
selves) and/or in the subject-matter of the litigation.
4.1 The Jurisprudential Travails of the (Pro-Poor) Labor Movement  
in Nigeria
In analyzing the ways in which the appellate courts in Nigeria have responded 
to the struggles of the poor to realize their rights, two different lines of cases 
are examined as emblematic of the overall situation. In the first instance, a line 
of cases involving the Nigeria Labor Congress (NLC), the central labor union 
in Nigeria that has been at the vanguard of these efforts and which usually 
couches its struggles in especially pro-poor terms, are examined in the  current 
Litigation in Comparative Context’, 20 Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal (2001–2002), 
19–100; L.G. Trubek, ‘Crossing Bondaries: Legal Education and the Challenges of the “New 
Public Interest Law” ’, Wisconsin Law Review (2005), 455–477; T. Abayomi, ‘Continuities 
and Changes in the Development of Civil Liberties Litigation in Nigeria’, 22 University of 
Toledo Law Review (1990–1991), 1035–1063; R. Atuguba, ‘Human Rights and the Limits of 
Public Interest Law: Ghana’s Reaction to a Messy World Phenomenon’, 13 UCLA Journal of 
International Law and Foreign Affairs (2008), 97–128.
35    L.A. Atsegbua, ‘Locus Standi: Beyond Section 6(6)(b) of the 1979 Constitution of Nigeria: 
A Comparative Study’, 2 African Journal of International and Comparative Law (1990), 
314–320.
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sub-section.36 Thereafter, a second line of cases involving other pro-poor strug-
gles is analyzed in another sub-section.
With regard to a background to the first line of cases, it is fair to state that 
not only does the NLC struggle through strikes and other forms of protest to 
protect the welfare of its members, almost all of whom are within the lower 
income social brackets in Nigeria, it is also involved in wider campaigns that 
benefit not just its members but the society as a whole (especially the impov-
erished and the marginalized). And arguably, these Labor-led struggles often 
generate both economic and political benefits for the poor.37
However, Labor’s activities in this regard have been conducted at great cost 
to its leaders and members, largely because of the high-handedness of pre-
vious executive branches of government in Nigeria which have tried several 
times in the recent past to break up its umbrella group, the NLC, into smaller 
components, so as to weaken its influence. Importantly, and interestingly, all 
of these attempts have been met with failure. For example, in 2005, the sup-
posedly democratically elected government in Nigeria pushed through a law 
amending the Trade Unions Act and introducing far-reaching changes to the 
way the organized labor movement conducted its activities in the country. This 
law in effect limited the scope of the subject-matter or issues over which labour 
unions and the NLC (or some other “central labour organization”) can call a 
strike; barred strikes in so-called essential services; set stringent precondi-
tions for strikes; allowed for the creation of other central labour organizations 
apart from the NLC; and barred the picketing of airports or public highways to 
obstruct air or motor vehicular traffic.38
In dealing here with the issue of the attitude of the Nigerian appellate 
courts to the human rights “struggles” of the poor and the marginalized, the 
NLC is taken to represent such a group that struggles in aid of the realization of 
the interests of the larger public, and its agitation against increases in the price 
of motor vehicle fuel (gasoline) is regarded as one socio-economic rights issue 
36    O.C. Okafor, ‘What Should Organized Human Rights Activism in Africa Become: 
Contributory Insights from a Comparison of NGOs and Labor-Led Movements in Nigeria’, 
16 Buffalo Human Rights Law Review (2010), 113–154, at 114.
37    See, for example, K.C. Nwoko, ‘Trade Unionism and Governance in Nigeria: A Paradigm 
Shift from Labour Activism to Political Opposition’, 2 Information, Society and Justice 
(2009), 139–152.
38    O.C. Okafor, ‘The Precarious Place of Labour Rights and Movements in Nigeria’s Dual 
Economic and Political Transition, 1999–2005’, 51 Journal of African Law (2007), 68–94, at 
84–85.
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around which its struggles are organized. The reason the price of fuel is such an 
important socio-economic rights issue in Nigeria is grounded in part in the fact 
that although Nigeria is the sixth largest producer of petroleum in the world, 
over half of its overall population is mired in poverty.39 Although this number 
has come significantly down since 1999, it is still a huge one. Furthermore:
[D]ecent public transport is still either unattractive, unaffordable, inef-
ficient and/or unavailable; public transportation is almost all owned and 
dominated by profiteering private operators; steep inflation in the price 
of food and other essential commodities (often resulting from increases 
in the cost of transportation) is rampant; and the costs of doing business 
are easily and devastatingly increased by high fuel costs. The cost of fuel 
is therefore a highly significant indicator of socio-economic well-being 
(or more accurately the lack thereof ). Nigeria’s poor majority and people 
with fixed incomes (such as unionized workers) are particularly affected 
by the negative impact of high fuel costs.40
It should also be noted that although the Nigerian government’s practice of 
increasing the price of fuel is a recurring one, the analysis in this article covers 
the period starting from the restoration of civil rule in 1999.
Overall there had been some 23 instances of fuel price hikes in Nigeria from 
1978 to 2012.41 Eleven of those hikes happened within the period January 1999 
to January 2012.42 Other studies have generated conflicting data.43 This in no 
way, however, detracts from the high frequency of the government-promul-
gated generally upward slant in fuel prices over time. One particular instance 
of the fuel price increase precipitated a dimension of the struggle against it 
that was waged by the movement through the courts. It started early in 2004 
when the executive branch of the Nigerian federal government decided to 
39    O.C. Okafor, ‘Between Elite Interests and Pro-Poor Resistance: The Nigerian Courts and 
Labour-led Anti-Fuel Price Hike Struggles (1999–2007)’, 54 Journal of African Law (2010), 
95–118, at 98.
40    Ibid.
41    C. Ndujihe, ‘Fuel Subsidy Crisis: Labour versus Govt; Who blinks First?’ Vanguard Online: 
see also E.F. Ogunbodede, A.O. Ilesanmi and F. Olurakinse, ‘Petroleum Motor Spirit (PMS) 
Pricing Crisis and the Nigerian Public Passenger Transportation System’, 5 The Social 
Sciences (2010), 113–121.
42    Ibid.
43    S.O. Ering and F.U. Akpan, ‘The Politics of Fuel Subsidy, Populist Resistance and its Socio-
Economic Implications for Nigeria’, 12 Global Journal of Human Social Science (2012), 
12–19.
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impose yet another fuel price hike. In response to the proposed government 
action, the labor movement put the government on notice about its desire to 
launch a strike in protest against the price increase.44 The executive branch 
of government then commenced legal action against the labor movement, 
praying the court for an injunction restraining the labor movement from pro-
ceeding with the strike. The executive branch of government contended, inter 
alia, that the strike notice did not disclose or advance a trade dispute strictly 
so-called. For its own part, the labor movement argued that the price hike 
was illegal and unconstitutional. It also asserted that the executive branch of 
government could not validly implement the price hike policy absent a law 
passed to that effect by the National Assembly. In Labor’s view, the fact that 
the executive branch of government had not acted under a law passed by the 
National Assembly meant that the executive arm was acting unconstitution-
ally by usurping legislative powers. The High Court ruled in favor of the govern-
ment, holding that the price hike did not qualify as a trade dispute entitling the 
labor movement to undertake a strike against that policy. A dissatisfied labor 
movement appealed the decision.
In its judgment, the Court of Appeal held that for the dispute at hand to 
come within the Trade Disputes Act, it must involve trade, as distinct from a 
political, dispute. It reasoned that what the labor movement set out to achieve 
in this case (including calling out its allies such as market women and school 
children and causing the permanent cessation of all vehicular movement and 
shutting down of airlines) did not fall within the meaning of the Act. This, the 
appellate court further held, was the case because “one cannot put these other 
persons [market women, school children, etc.] within the employment cov-
ered by the trade unions being used.”45 Explained differently, the court was of 
the view that the Labor movement has no litigable interest in challenging pub-
lic policies that do not have a direct relationship to its members as workers.
The court’s reasoning in this case did not quite go down well in some circles. 
Many critics decried the approach of the appeal court, arguing – inter alia – 
that the judgment was “much too cursory and far too unsystematic to provide 
much insight into the logic that underpins it.”46 On the specific question of 
whether a hike in the price of gas could be considered a trade dispute, one the 
present authors has argued elsewhere that:
44    Adams Oshiomhole and Another v Federal Government of Nigeria and Another, [2007] 
8 NWLR (Pt 1035) 58 [Ng Ct App].
45    Ibid.
46    Okafor, supra note 41, at 109.
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For one, the court devoted barely two double-spaced pages to its own 
reasoning concerning this pivotal and highly consequential aspect of 
its decision (much of which was in any case taken up by a paraphrase 
of the relevant legislative provision). The court offered no analysis at 
all of the elements of the definition of a trade dispute on which it relied. 
These elements were simply reproduced from the relevant legislation. 
The court made no attempt systematically and carefully to relate this 
definition to the facts of the case. The reader is thus left in the dark as to 
what exactly it is about the NLC’s fuel pricing dispute with the govern-
ment that disqualifies from meeting the definition of a trade dispute.47
This criticism has to be placed in context, however. A different case had been 
filed the same year and had been adjudicated before the latter case that ended 
up at the Court of Appeal.48
The High Court in this other case followed a different route when it decided 
that Nigerian law does not prevent workers from organizing or participating 
in strikes over issues that concern their interests. According to the court, the 
word “interest” had not been clearly defined and cannot therefore be limited 
only to matters regulating the terms and conditions of employment of workers 
as stipulated in the Trade Unions Act. The court’s reasoning was that workers’ 
interests are not limited to plain employment issues but are wide enough to 
cover government policies that may have no direct bearing on employment 
conditions but nonetheless affect workers’ interests in other ways.
Placed alongside the decision in the BPE case that is discussed below and 
the latter decision in the fuel pricing cases, this judgment suggests a jurispru-
dential binary in the orientation of the courts. While the High Court decision 
would obviously be categorized as pro-poor, the Court of Appeal judgment is 
certainly much less so. But given the hierarchy of courts in Nigeria, the deci-
sion of the Court of Appeal prevails over that of the High Court.
However, the High Court decision (which is in any case outside the limits of 
this article which is focused on the appellate courts) is mentioned not as proof 
that it represents the current formal legal position in Nigeria. On the contrary 
it has been presented so as to demonstrate the fact that alternative progressive 
tendencies did exist within the judiciary in general at the time in question. It is 
not in doubt which tendency between the two examined here serves better the 
interests of lower income workers and other impoverished groups in Nigeria. 
47    Ibid. at 109–110.
48    Federal Government of Nigeria and Another v Adams Oshiomhole and Another, Suit No. 
FCT/CV/350/2004 [FCT Fed High Ct].
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For, to the extent that the Court of Appeal decision prevents workers and their 
allies from organizing to thwart the imposition of such anti-poor fuel pricing 
policies, it would itself be anti-poor.
Another case through which the attitude of the Nigerian appellate courts 
to the struggles of the poor can be deciphered is the Court of Appeal decision 
in the Adams Oshiomhole case, where it held that the rights of the members of 
the Nigeria Labor Congress (NLC) to assemble or express themselves cannot be 
enjoyed at the expense of “the public good.” But what is the public good that 
the court had in mind here? Although the court did not define it, an explana-
tion could be furnished by examining Upendra Baxi’s theory on the emergence 
in our time of a Trade Related and Market-Friendly (TREMF) human rights 
paradigm.49 According to this understanding of the workings of contemporary 
human rights discourse and praxis,50 the progressive state is now seen, in the 
dominant trend, as one which is a good host to global capital, protects this cap-
ital against political instability and market failure, is market efficient in sup-
pressing and de-legitimating the human rights-based practices of resistance 
of its own citizens, and is capable of unleashing a reign of terror on those of 
its citizens who actively oppose its excessive softness towards global capital.51
When the struggles of the labor movement in Nigeria during much of the 
period under study and the reasoning in the cases discussed above, are exam-
ined against this TREMF theory of human rights discourse/praxis it becomes 
fairly clear whose side the executive branch of the Nigerian government and 
the appellate courts stood on. For this to be clear, it has to be understood that 
Nigeria was at this time undergoing a dual political and economic transition; 
one which was grounded in the overarching neo-liberal policies largely sold 
to it by the Bretton Woods institutions (i.e. the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund). Such policies have tended to be grounded in the imperatives 
of neo-liberal globalization and have been generally flanked on all its corners by 
the principles/policies of deregulation, denationalization, and disinvestment.52 
Implementing these objectives has often pitched the labor movement against 
governments and global capital.53
49    Baxi, supra note 2.
50    See O.C. Okafor, ‘Assessing Baxi’s Thesis on an Emergent Trade-Related Market-Friendly 
Human Rights Paradigm: Recent Evidence from Nigerian Labor-Led Struggles’, 1 Law, 
Social Justice and Global Development Journal (2007), 1.
51    Ibid.
52    Ibid.
53    See, for example, N.J. Mitchell and J.M. McCormick, ‘Economic and Political Explanations 
of Human Rights Violations’, 40 World Politics (1988), 476–498, at 479.
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As such, the “public good” that the Court of Appeal mentioned in the latter 
decision discussed above could be viewed as amounting to the perceived need 
to sustain Nigeria’s social and political stability so that government and private 
capital alike could be protected. In the face of these twin imperatives, joined 
together by the umbilical cord of mutual interest, it did not really matter that 
the human rights of average (including the vastly numerous poor) Nigerians 
to assemble, associate and express themselves freely on government policies 
were being so excessively sacrificed at the shrine of political and economic 
stability.
Similar labor-related, if more minor, cases include the case of Bureau of 
Public Enterprises v. National Union of Electricity Employees54 commenced by 
one of NLC’s affiliate unions. The questions before the court were (1) what was 
a trade dispute, and (2) whether the action taken in this case by the govern-
ment body charged with privatizing public corporations aimed at preventing 
a strike was indeed a trade dispute within the meaning of the Trade Disputes 
Act, 1990? The facts of that case were that the appellant was the government 
agency charged with privatizing government corporations while respondents 
were employees of the National Electric Power Authority (NEPA), one of the 
corporations marked out at the time to be privatized (and which has now 
been successfully unbundled and privatized). The respondents threatened a 
strike action if the appellant moved forward with its plans to privatize NEPA. 
Appellant filed this law suit to forestall the planned strike action. The respon-
dents objected to the suit on grounds that appellant lacked locus standi to 
institute it because there was no relationship of employer/employee involved. 
After a hearing on the objection, the court ruled that the suit was within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court and struck it out. On 
appeal, the appellants contended that as no trade dispute was disclosed in 
the suit, the High Court did have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. The 
respondents also filed a cross-appeal. In its judgment, the Court of Appeal held 
that by virtue of section 47(1) of the Trade Disputes Act 1990, “trade dispute” is 
defined as any dispute between the employers and workers or between work-
ers and workers which is connected with employment or non-payment or the 
terms of employment and physical conditions of work of any person. It found 
that the case before it did not indicate a trade dispute within the meaning 
of the statute, since it was neither between the employer and employees, nor 
employees and employees. On this basis, the court concluded that if there was 
no trade dispute within the meaning of the statute, the High Court and not the 
National Industrial Court had jurisdiction to hear it.
54    [2003] 13 NWLR (Pt 837) 382.
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To what extent was this decision pro- or anti-poor in orientation, and to 
what degree does it confirm or debunk Upendra Baxi’s TREMF theory of human 
rights (whether in whole or in part)? Although the fact that the court did not 
answer the major question arising for consideration in this case reduces the 
opportunity to apply the TREMF thesis to its decision, it is still possible to 
“read” the decision of the Court of Appeal for its orientation. But when this 
decision is placed side-by-side the new government’s single minded determi-
nation to see through its privatization agenda, it would make sense if viewed 
through the TREMF filter. The government trumpeted the position that to 
attract foreign capital in the form of direct investments, monopolies like NEPA 
had to be broken and businesses needed to be competitive.55 According to this 
policy, the government had to withdraw from all commercial activities and set-
tle into the simple role of creating the right business environment. The labor 
movement had disagreed with this position and had challenged it at every 
turn. Although its finding that there was no trade dispute as such could, as we 
have argued, work in an anti-poor way, the fact that the Court of Appeal con-
cluded that the matter could still be litigated (albeit in the High Court which 
possesses a broad and general jurisdiction), was a positive for Labor’s strug-
gles and the poor and marginalized on whose behalf it sought to pressure the 
government. This case did not, therefore, either fully vindicate or trouble 
the Baxian TREMF theory. For neither the government/private capital (on the 
one hand) nor the pro-poor litigants (on the other hand) won a decided and 
clear victory.
The last case that is considered under this rubric of the treatment of Labor-
led pro-poor human rights struggles in the jurisprudence of the Nigerian 
appellate courts is Medical and Health Workers Union of Nigeria v Minister of 
Labor & Productivity & Others.56 This case would also seem to confirm the 
unease with which the Nigerian executive branch of government (especially 
at the relevant time) tended to approach issues related to Labor-led struggles 
(including the rights of workers to form and register unions), and the actual fig-
urative “complicity” of at least some of the appellate courts in re- enforcing this 
55    E. Ugorji, ‘Privatization/Commercialization of State-owned Enterprises in Nigeria: 
Strategies for Improving the Performance of the Economy’, 27 Comparative Political 
Studies (1995), 537–560; A. Jerome, Privatization in Nigeria: Expectations, Illusions and 
Reality (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1996); A. Jerome, Privatization and Enterprise 
Performance in Nigeria: Case Study of some Privatized Enterprises (Nairobi: African 
Economic Research Consortium, 2008).
56    See Medical and Health Workers Union of Nigeria v Minister of Labor and Productivity and 
Others, [2005] 17 NWLR (Pt 953) 120.
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 attitude. In this case, the third respondent (the Registered Trustees of Nigerian 
Association of Community Health Practitioners) applied to the Minister of 
Labor to be registered as a trade union. The Minister referred the application 
to the office of the Registrar of Trade Unions, which was the second respon-
dent in the appeal in this case. On the recommendation of the 2nd respondent, 
the 1st respondent (the Minister of Labor) denied the application for registra-
tion. The third respondent therefore filed an action for judicial review of the 
decision to deny the application. Before this application could be determined 
on its merits the appellant in this case (i.e. the Medical and Health Workers 
Union of Nigeria) applied to be joined in it as a co-defendant in the case at first 
instance, a request that the trial court granted. Upon hearing 3rd respondent’s 
application for judicial review, the court decided in their favor. It held that the 
decision to deny the 3rd respondent’s request for registration was invalid and 
unconstitutional because it violated the right to associate and to belong to a 
trade union recognized by the constitution and the African charter. The appel-
lant, being dissatisfied with the decision, took the case to the Court of Appeal. 
The appellate court held that the right to freedom of association granted under 
section 40 of the 1999 Constitution is not absolute but is qualified by the provi-
sions of section 45. It also held that the provisions of sections 3 and 5 of the 
Trade Unions Act which prescribe conditions to be met by an applicant before 
it could be registered as a trade union are not inconsistent with the provisions 
of the 1999 Constitution.
One cannot escape the conclusion that this decision was shaped to a sig-
nificant extent by the atmosphere in the country at the relevant time, when 
the government and trade unions were very much at loggerheads, locked in 
intense struggles over privatization, fuel price increases, and the like.57 Under 
these conditions, it may not have made sense for the government to permit 
the registration of one more union when almost all of those already in exis-
tence were at loggerheads with it and had been quite successful in mobilizing 
public opinion against the then government.58 And since a quiescent labor 
movement is considered good for capital and a strong and vigorously strug-
gling Labor tends to be looked upon by capital and many others as bad for 
business, it also followed that the decision was in effect “good” for capital. 
Whether deliberately or otherwise, the decision of the relevant appellate court 
reinforced and sought to legitimize the government’s attitude and action and 
its rather obvious pro-private capital/anti-poor implications. It is chiefly in this 
57    See Okafor, ‘Assessing Baxi’, supra note 50.
58    Ibid.
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way that the reasoning in this decision appears to reinforce the validity of the 
Baxian TREMF theory.
4.2 The Jurisprudential Treatment of Other Pro-Poor Struggles
Here, the focus is on the treatment in the jurisprudence of the Nigerian appel-
late courts of non-Labor-initiated human rights struggles, especially those 
waged by individuals or civil society activists (including the NGOs) and which 
appear to resonate with or be significantly linked to the sufferings of the poor 
in Nigeria either. To what extent has this jurisprudence encouraged or under-
mined these struggles?
The fact that the Nigerian appellate courts have sometimes expressed sup-
port for the struggles of the Nigerian subaltern against their oppression and 
impoverishment by powerful elements within state and society in Nigeria 
can be gleaned from the positive attitude of those courts, in some (though 
of course not all) instances, to the pro-poor campaigns waged during the 
period under study by a range of human rights defenders and pro-democracy 
groups in Nigeria. One strong indication of this kind of positive attitude is the 
Supreme Court’s decision in the celebrated case of Agbakoba v Director SSS.59 
In that case, the Supreme Court strongly rejected the then federal military 
government’s argument that it was legally entitled to confiscate the travel 
passport of Mr. Olisa Agbakoba (who was at the time the seizure occurred the 
President of the Civil Liberties Organization and a prominent human rights 
activist) because all travel passports were the property of the state and not 
of the citizens to whom they have been issued. The court held that since the 
Nigerian Constitution and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(which is incorporated into the body of Nigerian law) guaranteed the right to 
freedom of movement to all citizens of Nigeria, including the right to enter and 
leave Nigeria, and since no one could meaningfully exercise this right without 
possessing a travel passport, the Constitution must be read to guarantee the 
implied right of every Nigerian to be issued and to possess that document.60 
This decision was a significant blow against the then prevalent tactic of the 
military governments that then held sway in Nigeria of attempting to pre-
vent the generally pro-poor human rights activists from travelling out of the 
country on missions to publicize the gross human rights abuses that were all- 
too-often committed against (mostly ordinary) Nigerians by these regimes.61
59    [1999]3 NWLR (Pt 595) 314.
60    Ibid., at 361.
61    See O.C. Okafor: ‘The Fundamental Right to a Travel Passport under Nigerian Law: An 
Integrated Viewpoint’, 40 Journal of African Law (1996), 53–61.
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A different kind of indicator of the positive attitude that the Nigerian 
Supreme Court in particular has sometimes exhibited regarding the strug-
gles of the poor against their oppression by powerful elements in Nigeria is 
the way in which this apex court made bold in Odogu v Attorney-General of 
the Federation to encourage such struggles.62 In that case, the SCN upped by 
a factor of well over 40 times the damages awarded to an ordinary Nigerian 
by the trial court for his repeated unlawful detention by the Police despite a 
court order that he be released.63 Here the Supreme Court correctly operated 
under the theory that the award of a substantial amount of damages against 
the Police would encourage the struggles of such vulnerable Nigerians against 
their oppression by such powerful forces in the country. To paraphrase and 
apply Nancy Fraser’s words to this context, the Supreme Court, in effect, pro-
vided significant support for the struggles of the poor against the “effects of 
power” on their “identities, interests and needs.”64
It has to be noted that the Agbakoba case discussed above was litigated dur-
ing the period of military rule in Nigeria (which ended in 1999), even though the 
judgment in the case was actually rendered just as civil rule was being restored 
to the country. This case epitomized what may be referred to as the more sup-
portive judicial approach even during that troubled period to the struggles of 
the Nigerian subaltern. However, the fact that the Nigerian courts were not 
always that supportive, and may even be better described as ambivalent on the 
whole, is underscored by a different line of cases, including Nwosu v Imo State 
Environmental Sanitation Authority,65 where a judge of the Nigerian Supreme 
Court basically advised victims of human rights violations to look elsewhere 
other than the courts for redress. According to Justice Modibbo Alfa Belgore, 
then the presiding High Court judge in this case, “legal practice will attract 
more confidence if administrative avenues are pursued rather than journey of 
discovery [sic] inherent in court action in such matters.”66 What the judge was 
telling litigants here is that, in his own view (which was not shared by all judges 
at the time) the courts were not in a good position to aid them in their struggles, 
for the simple reason that Nigeria was under a military rule at the time.
62    [1996] 6 NWLR (Pt 456) 508.
63    Ibid.
64    See Fraser, supra note 6.
65    [1990] 2 NWLR (Pt 135) 688 [Ng Sup Ct].
66    Ibid. See also C. Obiagwu and C.A. Odinkalu, ‘Nigeria: Combating the Legacies 
of Colonialism and Militarism’ in A. An-Na’im (ed.), Human Rights under African 
Constitutions: Realizing the Promise for Ourselves (Philadelphia, PA: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2003), pp. 211–250.
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This underscores the point that the apex court’s attitude during the period 
under study to pro-poor struggles was, of course, not uniformly positive. In 
particular, the Supreme Court’s attitude has therefore ranged from the positive, 
through the ambivalent, to the negative. It is necessary to canvass a number of 
other cases in other to ground this conclusion more firmly in the evidence. 
One such example is provided by the case of Dokubo Asari v Federal Republic 
of Nigeria.67 While the Supreme Court’s overall decision in this case (where it 
rejected the bail application of a leader of a violent Niger Delta militant group) 
is basically unassailable, some of its reasoning in that judgment is perhaps a 
good example of the kind of ambivalent attitude that the apex court has some-
times displayed toward pro-poor struggles against oppression. The court’s sug-
gestion in that case that once national security is invoked by the government 
the human rights of a citizen charged with a national security offence must 
give way, is – as a general principle – extremely problematic.68 It casts a long 
shadow of doubt on the rest of the reasoning in the case, and portends trouble 
for the effort to protect the human rights of even those who make bold to wage 
vigorous (and not necessarily violent) struggles for social justice in Nigeria. For, 
as is trite knowledge, governments in socio-political climes such as Nigeria’s 
are all-too-often too quick on the draw in invoking a so-called national security 
human rights exception against all kinds of political dissenters (be they peace-
able or violent).
The Dokubo Asari case arose against the background of skirmishes between 
the Nigerian government and youths of the oil-rich Niger Delta region who 
were agitating for more local control of the region’s oil resources. The appel-
lant was previously a leader of the Niger Delta Peoples Salvation Front. But 
at the time of his arrest had become the leader of the Niger Delta Peoples 
Volunteer Force. He and others were accused of signing a communiqué cas-
tigating the government at the various levels for looting resources belonging 
to the people and aggrandizing corrupt officials. This, they alleged, left the 
Nigerian people in a state of neglect and abject poverty. They also included the 
hike in the pump price of gasoline to the list of their grievances. As a result, 
they threatened to take up arms against the government as well as revealing 
plans to cause civil disorder that would lead to the overthrow of the federal 
government. Appellant was arrested and charged with conspiracy to commit 
felony, treasonable felony and forming, managing and assisting in managing 
an unlawful society. His application for bail was denied by both the trial court 
and the Court of Appeal.
67    See Dokubo Asari v Federal Republic of Nigeria (2006) 11 NWLR (pt 991) 324.
68    Ibid., at 358.
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On further appeal to the Supreme Court, that court commenced by holding 
that the right to personal liberty guaranteed by section 35 of the Constitution 
of 1999 is not an absolute right and that the personal liberty of an individual 
within the contemplation of section 35(1) of the Constitution is a qualified 
right which permits restriction on individual liberty. It also held that a person’s 
liberty can also be curtailed in order to prevent him from committing further 
offence(s). More than these though the court took a cliché straight out of the 
template of Nigeria’s former military governments when it further held that 
where national security is threatened or there is the real likelihood of it being 
threatened, human rights or individual rights of those responsible would take 
second place. It concluded that the human rights or the individual rights must 
be suspended until the national security can be protected.
Although the appellant in this case cannot really be considered a politi-
cian, his travails more than illustrate the attitude of the courts to cases that 
may have “high” political implications. The political issues brought to ques-
tion in this case included the nature of Nigeria’s federal structure, resource 
allocation and how to deal with the country’s varied minority agitations. These 
are all sensitive political questions striking at the foundations of the country’s 
political and economic stability. The facts of this case clearly demonstrate 
its volatile origins. It arose from government’s need to pacify the Niger Delta 
region of Nigeria (where almost all of Nigeria’s oil is produced) so to preserve 
the public peace and invariably enable natural resource exploitation, particu-
larly crude oil. Such efforts were intended to enforce peace and remove the 
threat to government budget that the crisis in that region was causing. It is also 
one case where the economic interests of the government firmly united with 
the ambitions of the private local and multinational oil corporations (MNCs). 
The pacification of the Niger-Delta was clearly in the business interests 
of these MNCs. It was therefore very crucial to achieve that end in order to 
establish the fact that Nigeria was indeed a good host to private global/local 
capital. It is in this sense therefore that this decision supports Baxi’s TREMF 
thesis which expects Nigeria’s courts to act in ways that enhance the interests 
of the government and private capital alike, even at the expense of the inter-
ests of the poor and the marginalized. Not only did the government seem to 
want to be seen as “a progressive state” (meaning one that is a good host to 
capital), it also fought tooth and nail – as this case goes some way in  showing – 
to suppress the struggles of those who (despite their inexcusable tactics) were 
courageous enough to challenge such exploitation and oppression that went 
on in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria.
Even where the interests of global/local capital are not manifest or easily 
deciphered, the manifest interests of the government have on many  occasions 
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seemed to sway and deflect the Nigerian appellate courts from a vigorous 
defense of the human rights of the subaltern in Nigeria. The case of Dominic 
Ekanen v Assistant Inspector General of Police69 concerns how the poor are 
treated while incarcerated and whether the appellate courts could institute 
and enforce rules that ensure that they are better treated if ever they end up 
on the wrong side of the criminal justice process. The specific questions in the 
case were whether an applicant could be denied the legal enforcement of his 
fundamental rights based on a technicality and if it is part of a person’s right 
to liberty to be provided with sleeping materials while in detention. For pres-
ent purposes, our analysis concentrates on the latter. The facts were that the 
appellant witnessed a beating carried out by a mob of about 50 able-bodied, 
armed men. They were attending a village meeting when this mob showed up 
in three vehicles and started beating one ACP Inyang once they had identified 
him. The mob tried to force him into one of the vehicles but he resisted with 
the assistance of some village youths. Inyang later reported the assault on him 
to the police. The appellant was called to the Police station for an interview, 
as someone who had been present when the beating occurred. After making 
a statement to the police, he was promptly arrested and detained. He brought 
a fundamental rights application claiming, inter alia, inhuman and degrading 
treatment, because the police denied him sleeping materials causing appellant 
to sleep while standing on his feet and when that failed sleeping on the bare, 
hard floor. The trial court failed to make an order and suggested instead that 
the case should be taken to Akwa Ibom state where the incident occurred and 
ought not to be heard in Calabar in Cross River State where the appellant was 
being detained. The appellant appealed this curious abdication of the judicial 
function. In its decision, the Court of Appeal held in part for him, but also 
reasoned that the appellant’s expectation that sleeping materials ought to be 
provided to him while in detention would be utopian in the Nigerian context, 
regardless of whether the detention was in a police station or at a prison. The 
Court of Appeal also reasoned that the appellant’s demand for sleeping mate-
rials is not justiciable. The judges claimed not to know of any guaranteed right 
to be provided with a bed to sleep on upon one’s arrest and detention. The 
appellate court reached this conclusion despite acknowledging that it is only 
reasonable to expect that a detained person will need to sleep! In the final 
analysis, though, the appellate court concluded that the question of where 
the detainee actually lays before sleeping is an entirely separate one. In their 
view, a person who is detained for an offence within the law is subject to a 
69    Dominic Ekanem v Assistant Inspector General of Police (Zone 6), [2008] 5 NWLR 
(Pt 1079) 97.
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constitutional disability and therefore cannot expect certain kinds of humane 
treatment.
Broken to its bare bones, the court’s reasoning is that any person arrested 
in Nigeria as a result of a criminal allegation and held in detention should not 
expect to be treated in a dignified manner. This would be clearly contrary to 
the provisions of the Nigerian Constitution, which guarantees the humane 
treatment of persons being processed through the criminal justice system. Yet 
the court’s attitude here is all too familiar and in character. The harshest treat-
ments in Nigeria’s criminal justice system tend to be reserved for the subaltern 
(especially when the perceived interests of the government might be contra-
dicted by a more favorable treatment), while the rich tend to be handled with 
kid gloves.70 Here, the effort and cost the government would have to expend 
in providing decent detention spaces (including sleeping materials) appears 
to have combined with the prevalent anti-socioeconomic rights ideology to 
orient the relevant appellate court’s reasoning in a decidedly anti-poor way.
However, the Wing Commander A. Adamu v Donatus Akukalia case (and its 
kind) provides some counter-point to the Ekanem case (and its type).71 In the 
former case, the appellant was a top officer in the Nigerian Air Force. The facts 
were that based upon the suspicion that the respondent (who was the appli-
cant at trial court) had stolen a briefcase containing some money the appellant 
had caused him to be detained at the Air Force facilities in Kainji and Lagos. 
Note should be taken that under Nigerian laws, civilians cannot be detained 
in military facilities. The respondent therefore brought this suit to enforce his 
fundamental human rights to liberty and dignity of the person. None of the 
court documents was served on the appellant personally because he osten-
sibly used the power of his office to make himself personally unavailable to 
be served the court documents. The Motion on Notice was served on appel-
lant through the Chief Clerk of the Air Force at its Lagos headquarters. When 
the appellant still failed to appear at the hearing, the court ordered Hearing 
Notice to be issued before the next date to which the case was then adjourned. 
That notice was accepted on behalf of appellant by the Receiving Officer at 
the Nigerian Air Force Headquarters in Lagos. When the appellant again failed 
to show up on the adjourned date, the court ruled against him. On appeal, 
70    See C. Odinkalu, ‘The Impact of Economic and Social Rights in Nigeria: An Assessment 
of the Legal Framework for Implementing Education and Health as Human Rights’ in 
V. Gauri and D.M. Brinks (eds), Courting Social Justice: Judicial Enforcement of Economic 
and Social Rights in the Developing World (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 
2008), pp. 183–223.
71    Wing Commander A Adamu v Donatus Akukalia, [2007] 4 NWLR (Pt 1023) 65.
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appellant contended that he was not properly served with the court docu-
ments and therefore had been denied the right to a fair hearing. His appeal 
was dismissed.
The decision of the appellate court in this case hinged on whether or not the 
initial law suit had been brought to the attention of the appellant. The court 
reasoned that it had indeed been sufficiently brought to his attention based 
on the sworn affidavit before it stating that the relevant court documents had 
been sent to him. The court reasoned that the rules of natural justice do not go 
in a one-way traffic but are meant to give equal protection to the competing 
interests and rights of the contending parties. In this case the relatively much 
more powerful Wing Commander lost to the comparatively much weaker 
party, as he could not convince the court otherwise and paid the ultimate price 
for treating the court process recklessly as many similarly situated women 
and men of power are wont to do the world over, Nigeria being a particularly 
problematic case. As such, just like the Agbakoba case, this case represents the 
line of cases in which the Nigerian appellate courts have stood up for the less 
powerful in society (who tend to be poor and the marginalized). It also repre-
sents the cases in which the courts have made bold to interpret the law and 
the Rules of Court in ways that have favored the poor and the marginalized 
over the much more powerful Nigerian elite. It is in these senses that this case 
(and similar ones) detract to some extent (however small it may be) from the 
postulates of the Baxian TREMF theory of human rights.
5 Conclusion
This article deals with the question whether the jurisprudence of Nigeria’s 
appellate courts has helped advance or impede the struggles of the poor to 
assert their human rights in the country. The article begins by defining, delim-
iting, and situating the concepts “struggle” and “human rights as struggle.” It 
then moves on to identify and discuss the factors that make the struggles that 
the poor and the subaltern must wage to realize their human rights a tough one. 
These factors range from the generally very high cost of litigation in Nigeria 
to the incidence (especially in the earlier part of the period under study) of 
official suppression of all-too-many of those activists who have appeared to 
struggle to assist the poor and the marginalized. Other such factors include a 
significant lack of judicial favour toward the poor and the marginalized, and 
certain problematic constitutional provisions. Following this discussion, the 
article turns its attention to its main focus, i.e. an analytical examination of 
the ways in which the corpus of human rights jurisprudence of the Nigerian 
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appellate courts has either aided and/or inhibited the struggles of the poor 
and the subaltern in that country during the period under study. The latter 
discussion is sub-divided into two segments: the first is focused on the engage-
ment of these courts with the pro-poor struggles of Nigerian Labour, while the 
second is devoted to an analysis of the attitude of the courts to other kinds 
of pro-poor human rights struggles in Nigeria. In both cases, given space and 
other constraints, only small but representative samples of the relevant cases 
are discussed.
In the end, the analysis suggested that the Nigerian appellate courts still 
have much more to do if they are to optimize their considerable (albeit still lim-
ited) capacity to enable the struggles of the poor and marginalized Nigerians 
to realize their human rights. For, while these courts have, in some cases, been 
able to decide the human rights matters before them in a reasonably pro-poor 
fashion, in far too many others, their judgments can only be characterized as 
either ambivalent or plainly anti-poor.
